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The Raisin Act: Regulation or Confiscation?
Horne v. Department of Agriculture1
Yelena Bosovik
I. INTRODUCTION
In Horne v. Department of Agriculture, the United States Supreme
Court settled the jurisdictional issues arising under the Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act (“AMAA”).2 Specifically, the Court considered
whether farmers – as handlers – can file suit in federal court to challenge an
administrative decision; and while in administrative proceedings, if the
farmers can raise a takings claims as an affirmative defense.3 This case is
significant because for the first time, it opened the doors for federal courts to
have the jurisdiction to consider whether a reserve condition imposed on the
sale of a commodity, like raisins, constitutes a taking worthy of
compensation under the Fifth Amendment. On remand from the U.S.
Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did indeed consider this
issue, and held that reserve pool seizures under federal marketing orders do
not constitute takings. However, despite making great strides in formalizing
marketing order litigation, the courts did not make the complete jump to
reforming what is a broken – and in some instances, unconstitutional –
scheme.
This note begins by setting forth the facts and events that have
narrowed takings claims jurisprudence. Although the cornerstone is the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision, which set the jurisdictional and procedural
guidelines for marketing order challenges, this note primarily focuses on
what the Ninth Circuit did on remand with the U.S. Supreme Court’s
1

Horne v. Dep’t of Agriculture, 133 S.Ct. 2053 (2013).
Id. at 2056. The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 authorizes the Secretary of
Agriculture to fix the minimum prices of certain agricultural products, when the handling of
such products occurs “in the current of interstate or foreign commerce or…directly burdens,
obstructs or affects interstate or foreign commerce in such commodity or product thereof.” 7
U.S.C. § 608c(6)(A) (2012).
3
Id. at 2056.
2
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instructions. The second section examines the legal precedent of takings
claim cases, and the historic use of marketing orders. The third section
provides both the U.S. Supreme Court’s and the Ninth Circuit’s legal
analysis. The final section discusses the policy concerns and implications of
this decision. The conclusion drawn is that by failing to consider the policy
concerns behind reserve pool requirements, the Ninth Circuit improperly held
that no taking occurred in this case.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In Horne v. Department of Agriculture, petitioners Marvin and Laura
Horne were owners and operators of Raisin Valley Farms in California.4
Under the authority of the AMAA, the Raisin Administrative Committee
(“RAC”) issued a marketing order setting up reserve pools for annual raisin
production as a supply-side price control mechanism.5 Under the Marketing
Order’s reserve requirements, raisin producers must file certain reports with
the RAC, and must deposit a certain portion of their annual production
(“reserve-tonnage”) with the reserve pool.6 The raisins held in the reserve
pools are not to be sold on the domestic market, but may be sold to handlers
for resale in overseas markets, or given at no cost to secondary,
noncompetitive domestic markets, such as school lunch programs.7 The
farmers are then only paid for the “free-tonnage,” or the remains of a year’s
raising production that is available for sale on the open market once the
“reserve-tonnage” has been given to the RAC.8 Raisin farmers, in other
words, must give a portion of their crop to the government in order to keep
raisin prices at a certain level.
The Hornes attempted to get around the reserve program by selling
directly to vineyards, therefore declassifying themselves as handlers.9
4

Although this case note is focused on the decision that came down from the Supreme Court
of the United States in 2013, it also takes into account the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals on remand, and the subsequent issues for which the U.S. Supreme Court once
again granted certiorari for on January 16, 2015. At this time, the U.S. Supreme Court has
not ruled on Horne II.
5
Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2057.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 2058.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 2058-59.
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However, in 2001 the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”)
informed the Hornes that their operation nonetheless made them handlers
under the AMAA, and they must pay in the required reserve amounts for the
2002-2004 crop years.10 Petitioners refused to comply, and administrative
proceedings were initiated by the Administrator of the Agriculture Marketing
Service for violations of the AMAA and the Marketing Order.11 The Hornes
denied the allegations and raised several affirmative defenses, including that
the Marketing Order violated the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against
taking property without just compensation.12
In 2006, an Administrative Law judge ruled the petitioners were
handlers and thus subject to the Marketing Order.13 The court rejected the
Hornes’ takings defense based on a view that “handlers no longer have a
property right that permits them to market their crop free of regulatory
control.”14 On appeal, a judicial officer upheld this ruling and fined the
Hornes $202,600 in civil penalties, $8,783.39 in assessments for the two crop
years, and $483,843.53 for the value of the California raisins that petitioners
failed to hold in reserve for two crop years.15
The Hornes then filed a complaint in Federal District Court seeking
judicial review of the USDA’s decision.16 The court upheld the original
ruling against the Hornes and found that the transfer of title from the farmers
to the RAC did not constitute a physical taking.17 Specifically, the court
quoted Evans v. United States, stating that the Hornes were “paying an
admissions fee or toll – admittedly a steep one – for marketing raisins. The
Government does not force plaintiffs to grow raisins or to market the raisins;
rather, it directs that if they grow and market raisins, then passing to title to
their ‘reserve tonnage’ raisins to the RAC is the admissions ticket.’”18
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that: (1) the Hornes were “handlers”
10

Id. at 2059.
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 2059-60.
15
Id. (citing Cla-Lamond, Inc. v. United States, 30 Fed.Cl. 244, 246-247(1994)).
16
Id. at 2059.
17
Id. at 2060.
18
Id. (quoting Evans v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 554, 563-564 (2006)).
11
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subject to marketing order provisions; (2) the takings claims was premature
until farmers availed themselves of the process provided by the Tucker Act;19
and (3) the fines imposed on the raisin farmers did not violate the Excessive
Fines Clause.20
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and held
that: (1) the AMAA provides a comprehensive curative blueprint that
withdraws Tucker Act jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims over
farmers’ takings claim in their role as handlers — as a result, the Hornes
were entitled to file suit in California district court; and (2) a farmers’ takings
claim can be raised as an affirmative defense in USDA enforcement
proceedings.21
On remand, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that:
(1) the Hornes had standing, as raisin handlers, to bring suit challenging
diversion of third-party producers’ raisins; and (2) the Raisin Marketing
Order was not a physical per se taking of reserved raisins.22 Specifically, the
court said that because the Hornes did not actually hand over any of their
raisins to the reserve committee as they were required to do by the Order, the
only way they can make a Takings Clause argument is to allege that the
penalties imposed on them constituted a taking.23 As such, the Court
concluded that the imposition and collection of penalties and fines does not
violate the Takings Clause, because if the receipt of reserved raisins does not
violate the Constitution, neither does the imposition of a penalty.24
19

Under the Tucker Act, the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction on all claims
for just compensation under the Takings Clause. Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498,
520 (1998). However, with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Horne, “handlers” are now
permitted under the AMAA to raise takings claims in Department of Agriculture
enforcement proceedings under § 28 U.S.C. § 608c(14)(b). Sarah Jenkins and Bruce Jones,
Supreme Court Decides Horne v. Department of Agriculture, Faegre Baker Daniels (June 10,
2013), available at http://www.faegrebd.com/20062 (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
20
Horne v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 673 F.3d 1071, 1080-82 (9th Cir. 2011) (rev’d on
appeal).
21
Horne, 133 S.Ct. at 2058 (2013).
22
Horne v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 750 F.3d. 1128, 1136, 1144 (9th Cir. 2014).
23
Id. at 1137.
24
Id. at 1137-38 (citing Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 133 S.Ct.
2586 (2013) (considered the issues of how to analyze a takings claim when a “monetary
exaction,” rather than a specific piece of property, is the subject of the claim. In that case, the
court held that “monetary exactions” as a condition of a land use permit must satisfy
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Furthermore, because there is a sufficient nexus between “the means and
ends of the Marketing Order,” the reserve requirement under the Raisin
Marketing Order does not constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment.25
The Supreme Court of the United States again granted certiorari on
January 16, 2015.*
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Constitutional Protections of the Takings Clause
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states, in part,
that the government shall not take private property for public use “without
just compensation.”26 The purpose of the Takings Clause is “to bar
government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”27
Historically, courts have implicitly recognized three types of takings. First is
the government’s exercise of the power of eminent domain.28 For example, in
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, Corp., the Supreme Court held
that permanent physical invasions of real property are a per se taking.29
Second is unintentional taking, or inverse condemnation through physical
invasion.30 For example, regulations depriving owners of all economically
beneficial use of their real property also constitute a per se taking.31 Third,
the government may take private property using its police power in order to
regulate property interests, requiring the government to pay compensation to
private property owners.32 This third type of property taking is at issue in this
case.

requirements that government’s mitigation demand have an essential nexus and rough
proportionality to the impacts of a proposed development)).
25
Id. at 1144.
26
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
27
Armstrong v. U.S., 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
28
Mary A. Viviano, The Takings Clause: A Protection to Private Property Rights in Federal
Oil and Gas Leases, 24 Tulsa L. Rev. 43, 49 (1988).
29
Loretto v. Temprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427-38 (1982).
30
Viviano, supra note 28.
31
Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
32
Viviano, supra note 28.
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But not every use of the police power restricting an owner’s property
rights qualifies as a taking. Traditionally, the Supreme Court engages in an ad
hoc factual inquiry on a case-by-case basis to determine if a “taking” has
occurred.33 As such, the Court identified several factors to guide its analysis.
First, a court may look at the economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant.34 Second, it is important to consider the character of the
governmental action.35 For example, a court may more readily find a taking
when the government physically invades the property rather than when
“interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”36 Although
traditionally takings cases revolve around the transfer of property to the
government or another private third party, “the Takings Clause applies to
other state actions that achieve the same thing.”37 Courts have also set bright
line rules regarding takings cases. For example, a permanent physical
occupation of property authorized by the government is a taking.38 So too is a
regulation requiring a property owner to permanently “sacrifice all
economically beneficial uses of his or her land.”39
When analyzing a constitutional takings claim, a court applies a twostep test.40 First, the court must determine whether the government action
constitutes a taking.41 If the answer is yes, then Fifth Amendment
requirements are triggered and the court must investigate whether the
government provided just compensation to the property owner.42 However, in
general, the Supreme Court has found that the imposition and collection of

33

Id. at 50.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). See also Goldblatt
v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) (“There is not set formula to determine where
regulation ends and taking begins.”).
35
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
36
Id.
37
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep’t. of Environmental Protection, 560
U.S. 702, 713 (2010).
38
Arkansas Game and Fish Comm’n v. U.S., 133 U.S. 511, 518 (2012). See also, Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
39
Arkansas Game and Fish Comm’n, 133 U.S. at 518.
40
Horne v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 750 F.3d 1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d 135 S.Ct.
2419 (2015).
41
Id.
42
Id.
34
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penalties and fines does not violate the Takings Clause.43 This brings us to
the Supreme Court’s cases dealing with unconstitutional takings.
In Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management Dist., the Court set
out the standard for analyzing a takings claim when a “monetary exaction,”
rather than a specific piece of property, is the subject of the claim.44 In that
case, petitioner, a landowner, sued St. Johns River Water Management
District, alleging that the district’s denial of land use permits, unless he
funded offsite mitigation projects on public lands, amounted to a taking
without just compensation.45 The Supreme Court held that “the government’s
demand for property from a land-use permit applicant must satisfy the
requirements of Nollan and Dolan,46 even when the government denies the
permit and even when its demand is for money.”47
In Nollan, the California Coastal Commission conditioned the grant
of a permit to build a beachfront home if the owners would allow an
easement to pass across a portion of their property in order to make it easier
for the public to access a park.48 After exhausting the administrative appeals
process, the Nollans filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandamus
with the Superior Court, alleging that the access condition violated the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as incorporated against the States
by the Fourteenth Amendment.49 The case eventually made it up the Supreme
43

Id. at 1137. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S.Ct. 2586, 2601 (2013)
(listing of cases) (“This case therefore does not affect the ability of governments to impose
property taxes, user fees, and similar laws and regulations that may impose financial burdens
on property owners.”).
44
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S.Ct. 2586, 2599 (2013).
45
Id. at 2588.
46
Id. at 2603. See also Horne v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 750 F.3d 1128, 1142 (9th Cir.
2014) rev’d 135 S.Ct. 2419 (2015) (“[T]he distillate of the Nollan/Dolan rule appears to be
this: if the government seeks to obtain, through the issuance of a conditional land use permit,
a property interest the outright seizure of which would constitute a taking, the government’s
imposition of the condition also constitutes a taking unless it: (1) bears a sufficient nexus
with and (2) is roughly proportional to the specific interest the government seeks to protect
through the permitting process.”).
47
Koontz, 133 S.Ct at 2603.
48
Nollan v. California Coastal Comn’n, 438 U.S. 825, 828 (1987)
49
Id. at 828-29. Although the Superior Court ruled in favor of the Nollans, the Court of
Appeals reversed the judgment, bringing the case to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Id. at 830-31.
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Court, which held that the absence of a “nexus” between the condition and
the Commission’s interest to provide the public with beach access constituted
a taking and required the government to compensate the Nollans
accordingly.50 This set the following standard for Takings Clause cases:
“unless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the
development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use
but an ‘out-and-out plan of extortion.’”51
In Dolan, the City of Tigard conditioned the approval of petitioner’s
building permit on the dedication of a portion of her property for flood
control and traffic improvements.52 Building on the Nollan decision, the
Supreme Court examined the “required degree of connection between the
exactions imposed by the city and the projected impacts of the proposed
development.”53 First, the Court found the city’s requirement that the
petitioner dedicate a portion of her property for flood and drainage system
improvement, as a condition of her building permit to expand a commercial
property, had a nexus with legitimate public purposes.54 Second, the Court
held that because the city’s public purpose was not proportional to the
condition imposed on the petitioner, the permit constituted a taking.55
As such, under Nollan and Dolan, a permit condition is an
unconstitutional taking if the condition does not have the requisite nexus with
a public purpose or if the condition is too onerous.
B. History of AMAA and Federal Marketing Orders
As the economy of the Great Depression aggravated overburdened
and unstable markets, Congress sought to help farmers obtain a fair value for
their agricultural products.56 So, as part of the New Deal, President Roosevelt
passed the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, authorizing restraints on
production of agricultural commodities.57 Facing constitutional scrutiny, the
50

Id. at 837, 841-42.
Id. at 838. (quoting J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 584 A.2d 12, 14-15 (1981)).
52
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 374 (1994).
53
Id. at 377.
54
Id. at 387.
55
Id. at 391, 394.
56
Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 174 (1969).
57
Daniel Bensing, The Promulgation and Implementation of Federal Marketing Orders
51
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Act was revised in 1935, and again in 1937.58 The original Agricultural
Adjustment Act authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to:
“[I]ssue licenses permitting processors, associations of
producers, and other to engage in the handling, in the current
of interstate or foreign commerce, of any agricultural
commodity or product thereof, or any competing commodity
or product thereof. Such licenses shall be subject to such
terms and conditions, not in conflict with existing Acts of
Congress or regulations pursuant thereto, as may be necessary
to eliminate unfair practices or charges that prevent or tend to
prevent the effectuation of the declared policy and the
restoration of normal economic conditions in the marketing of
such commodities or products and the financing thereof. The
Secretary of Agriculture may suspend or revoke any such
license, after due notice and opportunity for hearing, for
violations of the terms or conditions thereof.”59
The purpose of the AMAA is to “establish and maintain orderly
agricultural-commodity marketing conditions and fair practices.”60 To do so,
marketing orders are utilized to set uniform prices, product standards, and
other conditions for all producers in particular agricultural markets.61 Orders
exist for milk62 and for approximately 35 types of fruit, vegetables, nuts, and
specialty crops.63
Although the initial Act of 1933 faced constitutional scrutiny, it was
Regulating Fruit and Vegetable Crops Under Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of
1937, 5 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 3, 5 (1995).
58
Id.
59
Zuber, 396 U.S. at 174 (1969) (quoting Agricultural Adjustments Act § 8(3), 7 U.S.C. §
601 et seq. (2012) (original version at 48 Stat. 31, 35).
60
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 457 (1997).
61
Id.
62
Milk marketing orders are different from orders for other specialty crops. As such, this
article will not discuss the case law behind marketing orders concerning the milk markets.
However, it is important to note that a lot of AMAA litigation concerns milk marketing
orders.
63
National
Agricultural
Law
Center,
Marketing
Orders
Overview,
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/overview/marketingorders/.
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quickly revised by Congress, and since then marketing orders have been
repeatedly held constitutional under Congress’s power to regulate interstate
commerce.64 The constitutionality of the revised AMAA of 1937 was
challenged in U.S. v. Rock Royal Co-op.65 In that case, the Supreme Court
upheld the Act’s authority to set minimum prices and establish equalization
pools, and held the Secretary’s delegation in establishing marketing orders
constitutional.66 When issues arise concerning the authority to make
economic adjustments, courts consider whether the legislation in question
“states the purpose which the Congress seeks to accomplish and the standards
by which that purpose is to be worked out with sufficient exactness to enable
those affected to understand these limits.”67 The AMAA satisfies these
requirements.68
The Administrative Procedure Act sets out the process for
establishing marketing orders.69 Any person, including the Secretary, may
propose a marketing order through a formal written application process.70
The Secretary then investigates whether the proposed order will further the
policy of the AMAA to stabilize market conditions for the particular
agricultural commodity in question.71 A notice and an opportunity for hearing
are mandatory for any proposed order.72 Following the hearing, the Secretary
issues a decision either recommending a marketing order or denying the
proposal.73 Marketing orders are implemented by administrative committees
of producers appointed by the Secretary, and must be approved by two-thirds
of all the affected producers or by producers who market at least two-thirds
of the volume of the commodity.74 Producers75 impacted by the AMAA are
referred to as “handlers,” which the Act defines as “processors, associations
64

U.S. v. Rock Royal Co-op. 59 S.Ct. 993, 998-1000 (1939).
Id. at 997-98.
66
Id. at 1010-16.
67
Id. at 1013.
68
Id.
69
National Agricultural Law Center, supra note 63.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.; see also Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. at 461-62.
75
7 C.F.R. § 989.11 (a producer not impacted by the Marketing Order is a “person engaged
in a proprietary capacity in the production of grapes which are sun-dried or dehydrated by
artificial means until they become raisins.”).
65
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of producers, and others engaged in the handling” of covered agricultural
commodities.76 These committees also have the authority to impose
assessments on producers to fund the administrative expenses of marketing
orders, including product advertising, research, and inspection services.77
Handlers who violate a marketing order may be subject to civil and criminal
penalties.78 The Secretary may terminate a marketing order at any time if “the
order obstructs or fails to effectuate the declared policy of the AMAA.”79
The Raisin Marketing Order is at issue in Horne.80 Originally
promulgated in 1960, the Raisin Marketing Order was created to “stabilize
producer returns by limiting the quantity of raisins sold by handlers81 in the
domestic competitive market.”82 This order is administered by the Raisin
Administrative Committee (“RAC”), which is authorized to set up annual
reserve pools of raisins that are not to be sold in the open domestic market.83
After reviewing annual crop yields, raisin inventories, and shipments, the
RAC makes a recommendation to the Secretary as to whether a reserve pool
should be established.84 In 2002, the RAC set the reserve tonnage rate at 47
percent, bringing in 22.1 million pounds of raisins.85 In 2003, the committee
set the rate at 30 percent, and brought in 38.5 million pounds of raisins.86
The Raisin Marketing Order was challenged in Lion Raisins, Inc. v.
U.S., where a raisin producer sued the United States for unconstitutional
taking that allegedly occurred when the RAC resolved to use reserve money
76

7 U.S.C. § 608c(1) (2012).
Glickman, 521 U.S. at 462.
78
7 U.S.C. §§ 608a(5-6) (2012); 7 U.S.C. § 608c(14)(A) (2012).
79
7 U.S.C. § 608c(16)(A)(i) (2012).
80
Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2054.
81
7 C.F.R. §989.15 (According to the Raisin Marketing Order, a handler under the
jurisdiction of the act is “(a) [a]ny processor or packer; [a]ny person who places . . . raisins in
the current of commerce from within [the state of California] to any point outside thereof; (c)
[a]ny person who delivers off-grade raisins…into any eligible non-normal outlet; or (d) [a]ny
person who blends raisins [subject to certain exceptions].”).
82
Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2057.
83
Id.; see also 7 U.S.C. § 608c(6)(E) (2012); 7 C.F.R. §§ 989.54(d) and 989.65.
84
Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2057.
85
Jennifer F. Thompson, U.S. Supreme Court grants cert in Horne v. U.S.D.A aka The
Raisin Takings Case, LIBERTY BLOG (January 16, 2015), http://blog.pacificlegal.org/u-ssupreme-court-grants-cert-horne-v-u-s-d-aka-raisin-takings-case/.
86
Id.
77
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generated by designated year to subsidize raisin export programs for two
subsequent years.87 After the Court of Federal Claims granted the
government’s motion to dismiss, the raisin producer appealed.88 On appeal,
the Court of Appeals held that (1) Takings Clause claims are within the Court
of Federal Claims’ Tucker Act jurisdiction; (2) the handler’s action was not
cognizable as a Takings Clause claim in the Court of Federal Claims, since it
essentially alleged that RAC had violated AMAA by implementing
regulations; and (3) the producer’s action was not cognizable as a Takings
Clause claim in the Court of Federal Claims, since handler’s exclusive
remedy was administrative and judicial review mechanism of AMAA.89 The
Supreme Court declined review of this decision.
III. INSTANT DECISION
Before the Hornes’ substantive claims could be heard, the U.S.
Supreme Court had to make some procedural decisions. The first issue the
Court considered was jurisdiction. The government argued that the plaintiff’s
case was properly dismissed on ripeness grounds.90 The government relied on
Williamson County General Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank of Johnson City,91 wherein the plaintiff alleged that the Regional
Planning Commission’s zoning decision constituted a taking of property
without just compensation.92 In that case, the Supreme Court found the
plaintiff’s claim was not “ripe” because it had not been pursued in state court.
In Horne though, the Supreme Court held that the court’s reasoning93 in
Williamson did not extend to the Hornes’ claims in this case because the
87

Lion Raisins, Inc. v. U.S., 416F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. In a second action, this same raisin producer sued the United States alleging that
RAC’s taking without just compensation of approximately 2,230 of its storage bins. The
Court of Federal Claims once again granted the government’s motion to dismiss and the
handler appealed. These two claims were consolidated.
89
Id.
90
Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2061.
91
Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2055 (citing Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v.
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)).
92
Id.
93
Id. at 2061-2062 (In Williamson County, the Supreme Court found that the plaintiff’s
claim was not yet ripe because the plaintiff 1) could not show that he was injured by the
government’s action and 2) had not sought compensation through the proper channels
provided by the state.); see Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton
Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186-194 (1985).
88

222

JOURNAL OF ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY LAW VOL. 22, NO. 2
AMAA already provides a comprehensive remedial scheme, which
withdraws Tucker Act jurisdiction over a handler’s takings claim.94 Based on
this, the Ninth Circuit held that jurisdiction existed and the Hornes were able
to proceed with their takings claim.95
The second issue before the Supreme Court was whether a handler
may raise a takings-based defense in a USDA-initiated proceeding.96 Relying
on congressional intent, it was determined that the grant of jurisdiction
includes the power to raise constitutional issues presented to and rejected by
the agency.97 The Court pointed out that allowing handlers to raise such a
defense does not diminish the incentive to file direct challenges to marketing
orders, because a handler who refuses to comply with a marketing order is
still liable for monetary penalties if the constitutional challenge fails.98 In
conclusion, the Court held that the Hornes had raised a cognizable takings
defense and that the Ninth Circuit erred in declining to adjudicate it.99
It was then up to the Ninth Circuit to resolve the substantive
constitutional issues. First, the Ninth Circuit set out to identify which
property was allegedly taken from the Hornes.100 In the court’s view, the
Hornes linked the imposition of a penalty for not turning over their raisins to
a taking.101 To resolve the issue, the court relied on Koontz102 to rule that if
the receipt of reserved raisins does not violate the Constitution, neither does
the imposition of penalties for non-compliance.103 As such, the court found
that because the government neither seized the raisins from the Hornes nor
removed money from the Hornes’ bank account, no “paradigmatic taking”104
occurred.105
94

Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2055.
Id. at 2062.
96
Id. at 2063.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 2055-56.
99
Id. at 2063-64.
100
Horne, 750 F. 3d. at 1137.
101
Id.
102
See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S.Ct. 2586 (2013).
103
Horne v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 750 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2014).
104
Id. (“A “paradigmatic taking” occurs when the government appropriates or occupies
private property.”) Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005).
105
Id.
95

223

THE RAISIN ACT
The Ninth Circuit then proceeded to address the Hornes’ claim that
the Marketing Order, through a regulation, constitutes a categorical taking.106
After a lengthy discussion107 about which type of analytical framework to
use, the court decided to follow the Nollan/Dolan rule108 since it most closely
controls the kind of use restriction at issue in this case.109 To start, a
distinction was made between absolute and conditional requirements.110
Because the Hornes voluntarily chose to sell their raisins in interstate
commerce, the seizure of their raisins was merely a condition on the Hornes’
use of their crops.111 As in Nollan and Dolan, where conditions were set,
respectively, on the granting of an easement and a transfer of title, in this case
the “loss of possessory and dispositional control…[also] conditionally
grant[ed] a government benefit in exchange for an exaction.”112 The Ninth
Circuit then applied the Nollan/Dolan test, concluding that because the
structure of the reserve requirement is roughly proportional to Congress’s
goal of ensuring an orderly domestic raisin market, there was a sufficient
nexus between the Marketing Order and ensuing results.113 As such, no Fifth
Amendment taking had occurred.114
IV. COMMENT
This case raises a number of serious questions about the extent to
which the Fifth Amendment protects entrepreneurs – particularly, farmers –
against government seizure of private property under the guise of economic
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regulation. Specifically, the second time around, the three issues before the
U.S. Supreme Court are:
“(1) Whether the government's ‘categorical duty’ under the
Fifth Amendment to pay just compensation when it
‘physically takes possession of an interest in
property,’ Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States,
applies only to real property and not to personal property; (2)
whether the government may avoid the categorical duty to
pay just compensation for a physical taking of property by
reserving to the property owner a contingent interest in a
portion of the value of the property, set at the government's
discretion; and (3) whether a governmental mandate to
relinquish specific, identifiable property as a “condition” on
permission to engage in commerce effects a per se taking.”115
This note focuses primarily on the first issue and the constitutional
and policy implications arising from this decision. In analyzing any takings
claim, the most important initial step is to determine whether the action in
question actually constitutes a taking. Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit erred
in its analysis from the beginning. It took advantage of the situation at hand
to narrow the definition of a taking, simultaneously devaluing property rights
of all sorts. A layman’s illustration of the facts at hand demonstrates the
gravity of the situation. Based on the marketing order, and subsequently the
courts’ decisions, in 2003-2004, the Hornes would have been required to turn
over 306 tons of raisins (that’s 30 percent of their crop) to the USDA in
return for nothing.116 The year before, they would have had to give up nearly
half of their raisins and would have received less than their cost of production
in return.117 Despite these egregious results, the Ninth Circuit nonetheless
ruled that no taking occurred and that the Hornes were not entitled to
compensation, even had they complied with the Marketing Order and handed
over as much as half of their annual crop yields.
In reaching its conclusion that no taking happened in this case, the
115
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Ninth Circuit split a lot of hairs and focused on de minimis technicalities that
hold little constitutional power. For example, the court made a point to
distinguish between real and personal property. According to Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, Fifth Amendment Takings Clause affords less
protection to personal property than to real property.118 Specifically, the
Ninth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s statement that:
“[I]n the case of personal property, by reason of the State’s
traditionally high degree of control over commercial dealings,
he ought to be aware of the possibility that new regulation
might even render his property economically worthless (at
least if the property’s only economically productive use is
sale or manufacture for sale).”119
However, the Ninth Circuit failed to address other persuasive
authority that speaks to the contrary. For example, the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims (which, prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in this case, was the
primary source for litigating challenges to federal marketing orders), held in
Maritrans, Inc. v. U.S. that the Takings Clause does not afford less protection
to personal property than real property.120 Similarly, a D.C. Court of Appeals
has also affirmed that, in dicta, the Supreme Court has expressly included
personal property within the category of property that might be subject to per
se taking.121 In fact, in most of its cases on this issue, the Supreme Court has
reaffirmed the per se doctrine without any distinction between real and
personal property.122 The reality is that differentiating between real and
personal property for purposes of the Takings Clause is an artificial
distinction with no legal foundation. Both real and personal property have the
same potential to lose all economic value upon a government invasion. Thus,
the Ninth Court erred in placing so much emphasis on the fact that raisins, as
118
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personal property, are entitled to less constitutional protection than real
property.
If the court will not recognize the constitutional issues with the
mechanism of the current raisin marketing order, then it should at the very
least consider the policy implications. Granted, it is true that, as the Ninth
Circuit pointed out in its conclusion, the courts are not institutionally
equipped to modify wholesale complex regulatory regimes like this, but the
courts still have significant influence in encouraging legislators to make
necessary changes.
From a macroeconomic perspective, it is time to reconsider this
residual program from the Great Depression. Marketing orders were
originally utilized to stabilize market prices on certain commodities.
However, since some of these marketing orders – like the raisin one in
question here – no longer serve a legitimate public concern, perhaps it is time
to allow the markets to do the job on their own. Specifically, moving back to
competitive prices may better help price reflect the market value of certain
commodities – like raisins. Ironically, in an effort to stabilize supply, and
subsequently market prices, marketing orders are having the opposite effect,
which costs the American economy millions in wasteful overproduction.123
One of the justifications for marketing orders is that they stabilize
farmers’ incomes by protecting a commodity market from wide variations in
market prices based on unpredictable events like weather. Although that is a
valid concern, there are other ways markets can be stabilized which do not
require the government taking significant portions of private citizen’s
property in the name of the greater good. For example, as many farmers
already do, buyers and sellers of commodities can self-insure their crops
through the options market. By taking advantage of open markets, the risk is
spread across growers, distributers, and consumers. There is no evidence that
uncontrolled industries are any more unstable or disorderly than those
regulated by orders.124 Granted, different studies analyzing the impact of
marketing orders have shown contradictory results, but the results are often
123
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so minimal in either direction that no firm conclusion can be drawn on
marketing orders’ success. For example, one study found that non-dairy
market orders impose a cost of 0.7 cents to 7 cents per capita on consumers,
and gains to producers ranging from $478 to $4,912.125 On the other hand,
around the same time, another study found that the order system did not
result in higher average prices for consumers.126
If federal regulation is determined to be absolutely necessary for
markets to function efficiently, then there are other volume control options at
the government’s disposal. For example, an agency’s arsenal includes
shipping holidays, prorates, market allocations, and marketing allotments.127
Although each of these options limits, in some shape or form, how farmers
sell their produce, they are not as invasive as reserve pools which physically
take property from farmers. For example, shipping holidays prohibit handlers
from sending produce to the market during periods – usually a few days or a
week – when farm prices decline due to temporary oversupply.128 Similarly,
marketing allotments are essentially quotas where growers are allowed to
only sell up to their allotted quantities.129
In fact, if the government wanted to keep its current reserve pool
scheme, it could potentially improve things by pairing the reserve pool
requirements with marketing allotments. In doing so, the reserve pool could
help smooth out annual supplies and prices by carrying supplies from large
crop years over to small crop years. Granted, this is precisely what the Raisin
Marketing Order intends to do with the creation of its reserve pools.
According to the Order, a committee is established and tasked with selling
125
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the reserve raisins in a manner “intended to maxim[ize] producer returns and
achieve maximum disposition of such raisins by the time reserve tonnage
raisins from the subsequent crop year are available.”130 However, in their
complaint, the Hornes pointed out that they have not received any reserve
pool sale proceeds since the mid-1990s.131 For example, in the 2002-03 crop
year, the reserve committee designated 47 percent of that year’s crop as
reserve tonnage, which it then sold for $970 per ton; however, none of that
money was paid back to the raisin producers.132
Regardless of whether you look at the case from a constitutional
takings standpoint or from a policy perspective, it is clear the Ninth Circuit’s
holding in Horne is inconsistent with legal precedent and modern economic
needs.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, as the Supreme Court considers Horne this second time
around, it should reverse the Ninth Circuit’s decision and hold that at the very
minimum, forced seizure of raisins for reserve pool requirements under a
federal marketing order does constitute a compensable taking under the Fifth
Amendment. Furthermore, in doing so, the Court should take a firmer stance
on the relevance and efficiency of reserve pools, as well as the overall need
for reform of federal marketing order schemes.
*Editor’s Note: On June 22, 2015, the United States Supreme Court
held, in a 5-4 decision, that the Fifth Amendment requires the government to
pay just compensation when it takes personal property, just as it when it
takes real property. In this case, any net proceeds the raisin growers received
from the sale of the reserve raisins goes to the amount of the compensation
they have received for that taking; it does not mean the raisins have not been
appropriated for government use. The government cannot make raisin
growers relinquish their property without just compensation as a condition of
selling their raisins in interstate commerce.
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